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Perm

**Science is not monolithic- it is self reflexive and adds value to our lives. Perm solves best.**

Wilson 95 (Edward O., prof at Harvard and curator in entomology at the Museum of Comparative Zoology, speech to the convention of the National Association of Scholars, Academic Question, Vol. 8, 6-1, http://hiram-caton.com/documents/Evolution/Science%20and%20ideology.pdf, JMB, accessed 6-26-11)

I hope they nonetheless might agree with me that the nobility of science as a human endeavor was well encapsulated by the physicist Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar when he used the Icarus metaphor in praise of Sir Arthur Eddington. He said, "Let us see how high we can fly before the sun melts the wax in our wings." And on the appropriateness of the rosette of the National Academy of Sciences, the other NAS, that is splendidly symbolic in this sense: the gold of science is placed solidly in the center, surrounded by the purple of natural philosophy. Members are elected primarily or solely on the basis of objective discoveries they have made, expressible in clear declarative sentences, and not by any ideological test. By science in common parlance is meant natural science, which gathers knowledge of the world as an organized, systematic enterprise and attempts to condense it into testable laws and principles by a wide- ranging and shifting set of methods. The diagnostic features of science that distinguish it from pseudoscience are, first, repeatability: the same phenomenon is sought again, preferably by independent investigation, and the interpretation given it confirmed or discarded by means of novel analysis and experimentation. And second, economy: scientists attempt to abstract the information into the form that is simplest, most easily recalled, and most esthetically pleasing--the combination called elegance--while yielding the largest amount of information with the least amount of effort. Third, mensuration: if something can be properly measured, using universally accepted scales, generalizations about it will be rendered less ambiguous. And fourth and finally, heuristic: the best science stimulates further discovery, often in unpredictable new directions, whose content confirms or modifies the parent formulation. Science is thus not just a profession. Nor is it a delectation of mavens. Nor is it a philosophy. It is a combination of mental operations that has increasingly become the habit of educated peoples. It's a culture of illuminations hit upon by a fortunate turn of history, of uncountable small and large steps, of adjustments to reality during the past four centuries that yielded the most powerful way of knowing about the world ever devised.

Philosophy and science are intertwined, praxis is best

Guillory 2 (John, Prof of English @ NYU, "The Sokal Affair and the History of Criticism,Critical Inquiry Vol. 28.2 Winter 2002 p. 475-476)

The philosophical positions implicit in a given discipline's knowledge-claims are complicated by the status of philosophy itself. Though it is one discipline among many, it has strong historical claims to the position of primus inter pares. Consequently, the resort of the disciplines to epistemological defense is always subject to a kind of oversight by philosophy itself. As an instance of such oversight, one can do no better than a late essay of Althusser's, in which he cross-examines the philosophizing of scientists under the arch but appropriate rubric of "the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists."" Spontaneous philosophy as Althusser defines it is inseparable from scientific practice and stands in relation to it as a kind of ideology, though not an ideology that translates simply into positions on a political spectrum. This ideology has two complexly related components: an internal, which is the scientist's account of scientific practice, and an external, consisting of the specifically political and social commitments of scientists. Althusser is careful not to reduce the internal component to an effect of the external ideology. If there is a "spontaneous philosophy of the scientists," I suggest that the Sokal affair brought to light an analogous "spontaneous philosophy of the critics." Let us acknowledge, if this is still a question for anyone, that science as a practice is never wholly autonomous, that it does not transcend political or social context. But that was not the issue in the Sokal affair. The issue was rather the necessary political implications of realist epistemology, as this is supposed to underlie the practice of science (just as, conversely, antirealist epistemology is assumed in the critique of science). The spontaneous philosophy of the critics consisted not simply in antirealism per se but just as much in the assumption that epistemological positions have a necessary relation to political positions. Sokal hoped to discredit postmodernist discourse by claiming in his Lingua Franca article that realism, so far from entailing an inherently reactionary politics, was the more authentically left position." This strategic repositioning of realism was more challenging than Paul Gross and Norman Levitt's avowedly antileftist polemic, but it also oddly mirrored the axiom long prevalent in the literary academy of a necessary correlation between epistemology and politics. The hoax had the salutary effect of making the "spontaneous" entailments of this axiom very clear, namely, that an antirealist epistemology (alternatively expressed as antifoundationalism or relativism) is a requisite for any progressive politics and, conversely, that realism, foundationalism, or universalism underlie-at the level of the episteme, as it were-all that is regressive in our society. Because these philosophical positions (and their opposites among the scientists) were typically overstated and underargued, they could easily be reduced to caricature, which was quickly disowned on both sides. The scientific realists were only too happy to concede the cultural context of science, just as the cultural antirealists were delighted to concede the reality of the physical world. But if the controversy could have been resolved by displacing speech acts to the register of common sense, it would never have been propelled into the arena of public scandal. Spontaneous philosophy is something more than common sense, if also less than adequate philosophy. It is a discourse that is generated casually, in the context of practice, or urgently, in the context of a legitimation crisis.'3

Science good

Science may be imperfect, but it’s the best relation the world. Without it, neoliberalism and religious fundamentalism will take over

Center for Inquiry 6 (Endorsed by over 50 prominent scientists and scholars, Nov 14, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/advocacy/declaration\_in\_defense\_of\_science\_and\_secularism/, , accessed 7-25-11)

We are deeply concerned about the ability of the United States to confront the many challenges it faces, both at home and abroad. Our concern has been compounded by the failure exhibited by far too many Americans, including influential decision-makers, to understand the nature of scientific inquiry and the integrity of empirical research. This disdain for science is aggravated by the excessive influence of religious doctrine on our public policies. We are concerned with the resurgence of fundamentalist religions across the nation, and their alliance with political-ideological movements to block science. We are troubled by the persistence of paranormal and occult beliefs, and by the denial of the findings of scientific research. This retreat into mysticism is reinforced by the emergence in universities of “post-modernism,” which undermines the objectivity of science. These disturbing trends can be illustrated by the push for intelligent design (a new name for creationism) and the insistence that it be taught along with evolution. Some 37 states have considered legislation to mandate this. This is both troubling and puzzling since the hypotheses and theories of evolution are central to modern science. The recent federal court decision in the Dover, Pa., case has set back, but not defeated, these efforts. Moreover, the resilience of anti-evolution movements is supported not only by religious dogmatism but also by the abysmal public ignorance of basic scientific principles. Consider these facts: A recent poll by the Pew Research Center revealed that 64% of Americans are open to the idea of teaching intelligent design or creationism in public schools. Some 42% totally reject evolution or believe that present forms of life existed since the beginning of time. 38% would teach only creationism instead of evolutionary theory. Only 26% agree with the predominant scientific view that life evolved by processes of natural selection without the need for divine intervention. The percentage of individuals who accept the theory of evolution is lower in the United States than in any other developed country, with the exception of Turkey. Recent polls have illustrated other instances of scientific illiteracy: 20% of Americans think that the Sun revolves about the Earth Only 10% know what radiation is Less than one-third can identify DNA as a key to heredity In the U.S., twelfth grade students scored lower than the average of students in 21 other countries in science and math. We think that these dismal facts portend a clear and present danger to the role of science in the U.S. In our view it is not enough to teach specific technical subjects—important as that is—but to convey to the public a general understanding of how science works. This requires both some comprehension of the methods of scientific inquiry and an understanding of the scientific outlook. The cultivation of critical thinking is essential not only for science but also for an educated citizenry—especially if democracy is to flourish Unfortunately, not only do too many well-meaning people base their conceptions of the universe on ancient books—such as the Bible and the Koran—rather than scientific inquiry, but politicians of all parties encourage and abet this scientific ignorance. It is vital that the public be exposed to the scientific perspective, and this presupposes the separation of church and state and public policies that are based on secular principles, not religious doctrine. Yet government legislators and executives permit religion, instead of empirical, scientifically supported evidence, to shape public policy. Consider: Embryonic stem cell research, which promises to deliver revolutionary therapies, has been needlessly impeded by the misguided claim that the embryo and/or the first division of cells in a petri dish (blastocyst) is the equivalent of a human person. This is rooted in a moral-theological doctrine that has no basis in science. The nation spends hundreds of millions of dollars on faith-based programs of unproven efficacy, including ill-advised abstinence-only programs in such areas as drug abuse prevention and sex education, which are more successful at promoting misinformation than abstinence. Abstinence policies are advocated abroad and promotion of condom use rejected, heedless of the danger of AIDS and of the need for wise policies aimed to restrain rapid population growth. Scientific evidence of global warming is dismissed and the destruction of other species on the planet is ignored, driven by the misguided view that the Earth has been given to the human species as its dominion. We cannot hope to convince those in other countries of the dangers of religious fundamentalism when religious fundamentalists influence our policies at home; we cannot hope to convince others that it is wrong to compel women to veil themselves when we deliberately draw a veil over scientific knowledge; we cannot hope to convince others of the follies of sectarianism when we give preferential treatment to religious institutions and practices. A mindset fixed in the Middle Ages cannot possibly hope to meet the challenges of our times. Science transcends borders and provides the most reliable basis for finding solutions to our problems. We maintain that secular, not religious, principles must govern our public policy. This is not an anti-religious viewpoint; it is a scientific viewpoint. To find common ground, we must reason together, and we can do so only if we are willing to put personal religious beliefs aside when we craft public policy

**Rejecting science justifies racism, imperialism and turns their impacts**

Nanda 97, Phil of Science @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst, 1997 (Meera, “Against social destruction of science: cautionary tales from the third world”, Monthly Review, March http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_n10\_v48/ai\_19344899/)

One of the most remarkable - and the least remarked upon - features of the "radical" movement engaged in deconstructing natural science is how it ends up denying the unity (i.e., universality) of truth, reason, reality, and science precisely in the name of those who need these unities most urgently - the "people resisting despotism and its lies." This includes those of us from non-Western societies fighting against the despotism of some of our own cultural traditions, and the untested and untestable cosmologies that are used to justify these traditions**.** A loose and varied assortment of theories that bear the label of social constructivism have declared the very content of modern natural science to be justified, in the final instance, by "Western" cultural values and social interests. Once modern science is seen not as a universally valid knowledge about the natural world, but as a particular or "ethno"-construct of Western society, it becomes easy to see science as a part of the imperialistic West's despotism, which the west's "Others" must resist in the name of cultural survival and anti-imperialism. Modern science thus becomes a despotism, an object of resistance rather than an ally of those resisting despotism**.**My goal in this paper is to cast a critical look at these anti-realist and relativist views of "Western" science, which have gained wide currency in the postmodern academy; and I want to look at them from the perspective of the people's science movements in non-Western countries. These theories - unlike the Marxian idea of social mediation of knowledge with which they are often confused - have eroded the distinction between scientifically justified beliefs and folk beliefs and/or ideology. What has undermined these distinctions is the fundamental thesis of social constructivism which states that all beliefs alike are justified by the community consensus, which is itself based upon social power, rhetoric and custom. There is no objective truth about the real world which scientifically justified knowledge can aim toward, but rather all "truth" about "reality" is literally constructed out of choices between equally justifiable interpretations that a "thought collective" makes. These choices, in turn, are driven by the conscious and unconscious biases and interests of the members of any community of inquirers. Though varied in emphases and details, constructivist theorists agree that there simply is no truth, or even reality, that can transcend the local social context of inquiry. The "unities" of truth and reason that Ian Hacking speaks for (above), are treated in the constructivist discourse as remnants of the imperialistic impulse of the Enlightenment which sought to impose the West's own peculiar stories about truth and reality on the rest of the world. Such a view of knowledge justifies itself in the name of cultural autonomy, tolerance, and respect for non-Western ways of knowing the world and living in it. ButI will argue that, in actual practice, such "tolerance" has only ended up providing theoretical grounds for, and a progressive gloss on, the fast growing anti-modernist, nativist and cultural/religious revivalist movements in many parts of what used to be called the Third World. These movements seek to subordinate scientific rationality to local traditions, and thus are incapable of critically interrogating these same traditions, many of which are patently illiberal and oppressive to women and other marginalized groups in non-Western societies. Almost in direct proportion to the rise of nativist anti-modernist social movements, which correspond with ascendance of social constructivist theories in the academy globally, many pans of the Third World have seen a decline and stigmatization of people's science movements. These people's science movements seek to appropriate the contents and methods of modern science in order to bring traditional knowledge under empirical scrutiny and critique. In the part of the Third World that I am most familiar with - my native India - people's science movements have come to be eclipsed by the highly visible and vocal transnational alliance that has emerged around the idea that modern science is Western, and that the non-West needs its non-Western "ethno"-sciences. Affirmed and emboldened by the most avant-garde intellectuals in the West and at home, these nativist movements tend to label any critique of traditional knowledge from the vantage point of modern science as a sign of Western imperialism, or worse, a hangover from the old, "discredited" and "Western" Enlightenment (although, interestingly, they continue to applaud the critique of "Western" science from the perspective of ethnosciences as anti-Eurocentric, and therefore progressive).(1) Indeed, I believe that the recent electoral success of the religious right (the BJP) in India has definitely benefited from the cultural climate in which even the supposedly Left-inclined intellectuals and activists tend to treat all liberal and modern ideas as "Western," inauthentic, and thus inappropriate for India. Thus I will try to show that although the animus against the rationality of modern science is purportedly justified in the name of anti-imperialism and egalitarianism, its real beneficiaries are not the people but the nativists and nationalists of all stripes, religious or "merely" cultural/civilizational

**Space exploration good- environment**

**Space exploration is sweet for the environment**

Globus, 2009 (Al, Board Member, National Space Society), AD ASTRA, Winter 2009/2010, 43.

Space Settlement and the Environment

Space development has been good for the environment. It was a satellite that detected the ozone hole in the atmosphere, and today that hole is shrinking. It was satellite photos of the massive destruction of the Brazilian rain forest that convinced their government to pass laws to protect the Amazon Basin. A fleet of dozens of Earth-observing satellites are filling data archives with the information needed to understand the land, sea, air, and ecosystems of the only place in the universe that we know life exists: a thin layer on the outside of the third planet circling the Sun, just one of hundreds of billions of stars in the Milky Way, which is just one of 80 billion galaxies in the observable universe.

These space technologies have been invaluable to the environment, and the future looks even more promising. Sixty-five million years ago, an asteroid slammed into Earth, exterminating the dinosaurs and nearly every living thing in an environmental catastrophe dwarfing anything mankind could do. Today, we are systematically finding small near Earth objects that would cause “only” regional devastation to our planet, and we have ideas about how to deflect any that might head our way. Unless there is a major asteroid strike in the near future, the one that destroyed the dinosaurs may be the last.

Science Link Turn

Even if the K is right about objectivity, science is still the best approach because it helps humans temper their desire to control

Kukla 8 (Rebecca, Professor of Philosophy and Medicine at the University of South Florida, “Naturalizing Objectivity” Perspectives on Science, Volume 16, Number 3, Fall, Muse,)

Now this might seem to justify the sweeping rejection of self-effacing objectivity for which I criticized Barad above. For if there is no such thing as a transcendental perspective outside all local bodies of epistemic practices, then in an important sense the understanding of objectivity as self-erasure is simply incoherent, rather than merely limited and historically situated. Standpoint theory is deeply right, on this naturalized picture: knowledge is always and ineliminably the knowledge of a performative, concrete self who is situated within a particular, historically and socially contextualized body of norms. As natural beings engaged in natural epistemic practices, selves cannot adopt a stance outside of the nature they seek to know, and knowing is a material, interactive activity, and hence [End Page 299] there is no possibility of attaining objectivity by erasing the traces of the knowing self and its standpoint. Doesn't this make the ideal of mechanical objectivity fundamentally and unqualifiedly wrong-headed, as Barad, unlike Daston and Galison, believes? I think this conclusion would be based on an unsubtle understanding of mechanical objectivity. Let us grant that it is incoherent to believe that the self can, in fact, completely erase all traces of itself from the material practice of knowing, or that it can inhabit some unmarked perspective that is ontologically severed from the world. It can still make perfect sense to strive, in practice, to minimize the traces of the self, and to produce knowledge that is maximally reproducible and minimally tied to the particular perspective of its producer. Indeed, in some domains and for some purposes, holding oneself to this regulative ideal is surely a useful and important component of accountability to the real. (In addition to the many examples Daston and Galison offer, we might think of the task of the court stenographer, for instance.) Daston and Galison are clear that mechanical objectivity can only serve as a regulative ideal, and that at its limit point it would become self-undermining: "[Mechanical] objectivity . . . is epistemology taken to the limit . . . The demands it makes on the knower outstrip even the most strenuous forms of self-cultivation, to the brink of self-destruction" (374). But this does not, in their view, mean that the ideal is not actually mobilizable in practice. Norms can serve as regulative ideals even when they are never fully realizable—consider Kant's command that we abstract from our pathological existence as material objects and act in accordance with the demands of pure rationality, for example, which he certainly never meant to be a fully achievable goal. Indeed, the mere impossibility of an absolutely self-effacing, aperspectival form of objective knowing seems to be no count at all against the utility of this ideal in practice. In the laboratory, we regularly go out of our way to control some variables in order to better disclose the real relations between others. When we do this, we are under no illusion that the controlled variables have thereby been metaphysically excised from the natural scene. Similarly, I think that Daston and Galison effectively show that some scientific practices involve minimizing or 'controlling for' the influence of the self—but this does not mean that these practices depend upon an ontological picture upon which the self can effectively cast itself out of the natural scene of inquiry. Thus even if Barad is right, as it appears to me she is, that quantum mechanics is a domain where this ideal is inappropriate and distorting, she has not earned the right to extend this conclusion to other kinds of objects and epistemic projects—any more than the impossibility of walking through a forest without leaving a trace renders pointless the effort of minimizing one's impact on the land.

**Enviro Management Turn**

**Controlling the environment may not sound nice, but it’s necessary to end poverty and sustain value to life**

Zey 1 – Michael, professor at Montclair State University School of Business and executive director of the Expansionary Institute, a research and consulting organization focusing on future trends in technology, society, the economy, politics, “MAN'S EVOLUTIONARY PATH INTO THE UNIVERSE” The Futurist, Vol. 35, May 2001

We must examine the many ways such developments impact the individual, society, and the economy. And we must explore the underlying reasons why our species is feverishly working to advance the planet and ourselves and transform all we encounter. When we truly understand the depth and strength of man's overwhelming imperative to grow and progress, we can more clearly anticipate the future. At first blush, it would seem that there is little mystery about the impulses driving the human species in this quest: We engage in such productive activities merely to enhance our material condition. We invent technologies that will improve our standard of living and make our lives more pleasant and comfortable. Our species from the earliest periods of prehistory seems compelled not just to survive, but to grow, progress, and enhance itself and its environment. At each new level of our development, we endeavor to master our environment as well as the physical dynamics governing our universe. Humanity's activities, including the entire scientific and technological enterprise, represent a unified attempt by the species to spread "humanness" to everything we encounter. Over the centuries, we have labored to improve planet Earth, and we are now preparing to transform the universe into a dynamic entity filled with life. We will accomplish this by extending our consciousness, skills, intellect, and our very selves to other spheres. I label the sum total of our species' endeavors to improve and change our planetary environment--and ultimately the universe itself-vitalization. Vitalization is a force that is conditioning human behavior. The drive to vitalize--to imbue our planet and eventually the cosmos with a consciousness and intelligence--is a primary motivation behind all human productive activity. Vitalization is the primary force shaping human behavior. However, in order to pursue vitalization successfully, the human species must master four other forces, what I label the "building blocks of vitalization." These four processes encompass the extraordinary advances in areas such as space, medicine, biogenetics, engineering, cybernetics, and energy. The four supporting forces are: \* Dominionization: control over physical forces, such as energy. \* Species coalescence: unity through built systems, such as transportation and communications. \* Biogenesis: improvement of the physical shell, such as through bioengineering. \* Cybergenesis: interconnection with machines to advance human evolution. Each of these forces plays a critical catalytic role in the achievement of vitalization. Dominionization: Controlling Nature The term dominionization refers to the process whereby humankind establishes control over several key aspects of its physical universe. With each passing decade, we enhance our ability to manipulate matter, reshape the planet, develop innovative energy sources, and control fundamental aspects of the physical universe, such as the atom and electromagnetism. Someday, we will learn to influence weather patterns and climate. In a host of ways, dominionization helps humanity vitalize the planet and eventually the universe. As we master the basic dynamics of nature, we are more able to shepherd the evolution of our planet as well as others. As we develop novel and powerful forms of energy, we can rocket from one sphere to another. Moreover, by improving our already formidable skills in moving mountains and creating lakes, we will be better able to change both the topography and the geography of other planets. Examples of dominionization abound. Major macroengineering projects attest to man's ability to transform the very surface of the earth. By constructing man-made lakes, we will be able to live in previously uninhabitable areas such as intenor Australia. Shimizu Corporation envisions a subterranean development called Urban Geo Grid--a series of cities linked by tunnels--accommodating half a million people. In the emerging Macro-industrial Era, whose framework was established in the 1970s and 1980s, we will redefine the concept of "bigness" as we dot Earth's landscape with immense architectural structures. Takenaka, a Japanese construction firm, has proposed "Sky City 1000," a 3,000-foot tower, to be built in Tokyo. Another firm, Ohbayashi, plans to erect a 500-story high-rise building featuring apartments, offices, shopping centers, and service facilities. We will establish dominion over the very heart of physical matter itself. Through nanotechnology, our species will attain control over the atom and its tiniest components. Such control will enable us to effortlessly "macromanufacture" from the bottom up, one atom at a time, any material object. This will enable us to permanently eradicate age-old problems such as scarcity and poverty.

Commons fail

**Commons are an impossible utopian ideal that create inequality and unsustainability**

Aceves 01 Law Associate Professor, California Western School of Law 2001

William J., “Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 299, LexisNexis

B. The Limits of Equitable Distribution Despite the purported benefits of equitable distribution, a second strand of critical jurisprudence posits the futility of such efforts. In the postmodern tradition, this approach dismisses equitable distribution, arguing that it is only a temporary solution to the fundamental problems facing the international system. Indeed, these "crits" would argue that equitable distribution itself perpetuates other forms of inequality and is, therefore, illegitimate. First, equitable distribution is premised upon the equality of states - a noble premise, but one that is wholly unrelated to reality. Like snowflakes, no two states are entirely alike. Even within classification schemes, states vary along a multitude of factors, including historical, political, demographic, economic, social, cultural, and linguistic features. Equitable distribution overlooks such variation in its efforts to promote the equality of states within international organizations. In doing so, equitable distribution may [\*367] promote other forms of inequality. For example, equitable distribution policies do not take demographic factors into account. n297 Should India and Luxembourg have the same voting power in international organizations? n298 The problem of demographic disparity has worsened in recent years as new states, particularly small states, have entered the international community. n299 As noted by Professor Franck, "this problem of unfair equality has become much more pressing as a new wave tribal nationalism ... swells the rank of mini-states, all of them claiming equal voice." n300 Second, equitable distribution assumes that states within any of the enumerated classification schemes share the same interests, concerns, and preferences - a dubious proposition at best. n301 Indeed, equitable distribution assumes state classification is a simple and uncontroversial process. In fact, distribution based upon geographic classification schemes may be difficult to support in every case. n302 Not all countries located within a particular geographic area are alike. n303 Among African states, for example, do Egypt, Nigeria, [\*368] Rwanda, South Africa, and Sudan share similar interests and concerns? The same questions may be posed of states within Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. n304 Efforts to classify states based upon forms of civilization are also fraught with difficulty. Some states are not neatly categorized into any particular civilization. Indeed, there is significant controversy over the concept of civilization. n305 Even efforts to classify states based upon their respective legal systems must be undertaken with caution. n306 Many countries contain multiple legal systems within their borders which makes classification difficult. n307 In addition, the differences between legal systems are gradually diminishing, making such distinctions less relevant. n308 If the proxy theory is inaccurate, it severely undermines a key premise of equitable distribution. Third, there are no clear guidelines for establishing or prioritizing classification schemes. The traditional classification schemes have differentiated between geographic regions, legal systems, and forms of civilization. Is this list exclusive? Should demographic or economic factors be considered? Is this list outdated? Are geographic factors less relevant today? In addition, should particular classification schema be given priority? For example, should preference be given to equitable distribution based upon geographic region, legal system, or form of civilization? Fourth, equitable distribution policies do not always succeed in their efforts to promote equitable representation in international organizations. In this respect, it is important to recognize that equitable distribution policies do not guarantee equitable distribution. As currently drafted, most equitable distribution policies only [\*369] encourage states to consider equitable distribution principles in determining membership for non-plenary treaty organs and the selection of staff for international organizations. There is no mechanism to ensure that equitable distribution is manifest in the final membership composition. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not require that the Court contain an equitable distribution of judges based upon civilization and legal system. Rather, Article 9 merely requests electors to "bear in mind" that the "representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured." No formal sanction or remediation mechanism is available if equitable distribution is not accomplished. Because the principle of equitable distribution remains ambiguous and undefined, it can easily be co-opted by states to ensure that dominant powers are guaranteed a position in non-plenary treaty organs. For example, the practice of the United Nations has been to ensure that each permanent member of the Security Council is represented on the International Court of Justice. Thus, equitable distribution policies are subject to the vagaries of political and diplomatic intervention. Even if international organizations manifest equitable distribution in their composition, research data suggests that the underlying reasons for these policies may not be evident in the output of some organizations. In other words, the preferences of states that are not represented in non-plenary treaty organs may not always be expressed by proxy states. For example, studies of voting patterns in the International Court of Justice do not reveal significant correlation of voting patterns along regional or political lines. n309 Even voting patterns within the General Assembly do not always coincide along regional or political groupings. n310 Fifth, equitable distribution may promote the selection of less qualified candidates. n311 Thus, equitable distribution policies have been criticized because it "means to some extent weaker candidates must be preferred to stronger on the ground of the civilization or the [\*370] legal system which they represent." n312 For example, critics have argued that the priority given to equitable geographical distribution in the U.N. Secretariat "has been responsible for a lowering of the quality of the staff." n313 Sixth, equitable distribution policies perpetuate other forms of inequality. Because they only recognize state representation, equitable distribution policies only promote the interests of those groups that dominate intra-state politics. There is no mechanism for representing the interests of minorities, including racial or religious groups. n314 While representation may be viewed as equitable at the inter-state level, it often remains inequitable at the intra-state level. In addition, equitable distribution policies disregard the plight of people with "multiple subordinated identities." n315 Many groups, differentiated by such factors as race, religion, or gender, face several layers of subordination and marginalization in their own countries. n316 Women of color are a prominent example of people with multiple subordinated identities. Discrimination, both overt and implicit, has prevented women of color from attaining positions of power within their own countries. As a result, these women are often underrepresented within the power structures of their countries. n317 [\*371] Because of their marginalization at the domestic level, the ability of these women to participate at the international level is severely diminished. n318 If these women are from countries that are themselves on the margins of international discourse, their plight becomes even more pronounced. n319 Thus, women do not benefit from efforts to promote equitable distribution at the international level. Racial and ethnic minorities face similar obstacles. n320 It is not surprising, therefore, that few women are members of the various international tribunals. n321 In the entire history of the International Court of Justice, there has only been one female judge on the Court. n322 Gender composition in other international tribunals is equally unbalanced. The European Court of Justice, one of the most successful international tribunals in history, did not have a woman on the Court until October 1999. n323 The European Court of [\*372] Human Rights has only a slightly better record. n324 While the United Nations has sought to promote the development of women's rights within states, it has generally been less successful at the higher levels of power within the international level. n325 Finally, equitable distribution policies assume the state is the most appropriate governance structure to regulate human behavior. These policies do not change or challenge the fundamental structure of the international system; they merely work within the system. There is no effort (or apparent interest) in promoting structural change. Thus, the status quo remains protected against efforts to change the structure of the international system or the primacy of the state. Such policies overlook structural flaws of state governance. Do states adequately protect the interests of all individuals within their control? n326 Are there alternative governance structures capable of addressing the problems of humanity more effectively than the current regime? n327

ALT doesn’t solve

**Recognizing space as a commons is impossible- the government will inevitable co-opt it- moon treaty proves**

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The ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in the Moon Treaty, specifically regarding the CHM, made the US and every other participating nation save four put off ratification. This decision was made in the face of a US State Department report which indicated that the Moon Treaty was “the best possible structure for regulating activities which governments may now or in the future engage in on the Moon or elsewhere in space.”211 The Reagan Administration viewed the concept of the CHM as hostile to free enterprise and thereby contrary to the interests of “advanced” states with free-market economies. It would be a disincentive to development, a *de facto* moratorium, as had occurred after UNCLOS 1982. The US viewed the Moon Treaty as antithetical to US interests. The US thus adopted a resource distribution philosophy in line with the ‘freedom of the high seas,’ a ‘freedom of outer space.’ While the US maintains that no state may claim or acquire exclusive sovereign rights to outer space, it does maintain that actors may exploit resources as long as there is reasonable regard for the rights and activities of others. This free market approach applies universally. As the only remaining superpower, the US approach to exploitation and property rights versus the CHM approach is the biggest impediment to a truly de factorather than *de jure* CHM in outer space, or indeed anywhere. Given the fragmented nature of the regime governing space law today, the US, as well as the other space powers, are in a position to implement policy priorities without the restraint of multilateral commitments. Ultimately, this will prove detrimental to the commons as well as to development as entrepreneurs will not have the certainty necessary to invest with confidence.

Alt=oppression

Kritiks of power making fighting oppression impossible, which turns the K

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Hence, the only “ethico-political choice” we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is “the main danger” and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the “nexus” of opposing forces. 72 “Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril.” 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian “recoil” from the ubiquitous power perils of “normalization” precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the “twists” and “recoils” that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.